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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1953 TERM
Res Judicata
The familiar rule that the peace and good order of society
require that there be an end to litigation holds as well for the de-
cisions of administrative tribunals as well as those of courts of
law.'4  However, the peculiar characteristics of the administra-
tive. process are such that a rigid application of the doctrine of
res judicata is inappropriate.1 Decisions of administrative tribu-
nals are traditionally characterized as judicial or quasi-judicial.
on the one hand, and legislative, administrative, or ministerial on
the other. 6 Res judicata is usually held applicable to decisions
of the first type and inapplicable to those of the second type, al-
though investigation will show that the doctrine is not always ap-
plied in the first type and sometimes is applied in the second.
The application of the doctrine of res judicata to administra-
tive proceedings began in New York with a dictum in Osterhoudt
v. Rigney.'7 In a taxpayer's action to vacate audits of town ac-
counts as audited, it was held that the applicable statute did not
permit revision of the audits. The court then went on to say that
"[t]he rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once judi-
cially determined by a competent jurisdiction applies as well to
the decisions of special and subordinate tribunals as to decisions
of courts exercising general judicial powers.""' Lower courts
have followed this dictum rather rigidly, 9 but a recent case seems
to have cut into the extent of its authority. In Evans v. Monag-
han, 20 res judicata was held not to preclude the police commis-
sioner from retrying police officers on department charges where
they had been previously acquitted of the same charges due to the
refusal of the chief witness to testify. The court cited the cases
which established the heretofore prevailing rule of the applica-
bility of res judicata in such determinations and was at pains to
point out that the doctrine should not be lightly dismissed.
2
' It
then proceeded to hold that this case was taken out of the sphere
of the rule because of the availability of "newly discovered evi-
dence" not available at the first trial. Of course, even "newly
discovered evidence" would not justify a retrial of criminal is-
14. Johnson v. Towsley, 13 Wall. 72 (1871), Osterdoudt v. Rigney, 98 N.Y. 222
(1885).
15. See DA vIs, AD I NISTRATVm LAw 563.
16. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908).
17. See note 14 supra..
18. 98 N. Y. at 234.
19. Hyland v. Waldo, 158 App. Div.'654, 143 N.Y. Supp. 901 (1st Dep't 1913),
Stowell v. Santoro, 256 App. Div. 934, 9 N.Y. S. 2d 866 (2d Dep't 1939), Jones v.
Young, 257 App. Div. 563, 14 N. Y. S. 2d 84 (3d Dep't 1939).
20. 306 N. Y. 312, 118 N. E. 2d 452 (1954).
21. 306 N.Y. at 324, 118 N.E. 2d at 458, quoting from People ex rel. Finnegan
v. McBride, 226 N.Y. 252, 123 N.E. 374 (1919).
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sues, but double jeopardy is not here applicable since these depart-
mental charges are civil in nature. It was held that there was
no difference in principle between a case where a witness offers
to testify after refusing at a previous trial, and that of a witness
who later recants his testimony given at a previous trial. In the
latter case, the recantation amounts to newly discovered evidence,
which, in a proper case, is grounds for a new trial .2  The instant
situation was held to be analogous and the same principle to
apply.
The Appellate Division had come to the same conclusion by
carefully distinguishing the previous line of cases invoking res
judicata and apparently holding that, new charges and new evi-
dence being introduced, the issues at the second trial were not
identical with those of the first.23 The Court of Appeals assumed
that the charges and issues were the same, notwithstanding the
additional charges of perjury, but nevertheless found that a sec-
ond trial was proper. It is in this that the real significance of the
case is to be found. It appears that the application of res judicata
is not necessary even where the charges and issues are the same,
so long as evidence is available which was, not so before.
Requirement of Hearing
In acting in an adjudicatory capacity, an administrative
agency, like a court of law, must accord the parties affected a
full and fair hearing. -4 Hence, where the exercise of a statutory
power adversely affects property rights, due process requires that
courts imply the requirement of notice and hearing even though
the statute involved may contain no provision for a hearing.2
Such a situation is presented by Hecht v. Monaghan,2 involv-
ing the hack licensing provisions of the New York City Charter.27
Provision is made for revocation of such licenses in designated
cases, 8 but nowhere is it provided that a hearing be held prior
to revocation.
The Court of Appeals has recently held that an individual's
driver's license is a thing of such value as to constitute property
22. People v. Shilitano, 218 N.Y. 161, 112 N.E. 733 (1916).
23. Evans v. Monaghan, 282 App. Div. 382, 123 N.Y. S. 2d 662 (1st Dep't 1953).
24. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co., 227
U.S. 88 (1913).
25. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33 (1950), Bauer v. Acheson, 106
F. Supp. 445 (D. C. D. C. 1952), People ex rel. Copcutt v. Board of Health of City of
Yonkers, 140 N. Y. 1. 35 N. E. 320 (1893).
26. 307 N. Y. 461, 121 N. E. 2d 421 (1954).
27. NEW YORK CITY CHARTER § 436, NEv Yoix CITY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE§ 436-2.0.
28. NEw YoRx CITY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE § 436-2.0 (27).
